

SITE SURVEY REPORT

Confined Space Risk Assessment

Prepared for	Highfield Dairy Ltd
Date	22 Sep 2026
Site	Highfield Dairy, Carlisle
Prepared by	L. Brennan

FORM

Confined Space Risk Assessment**1. Record details and scope**

Project	Highfield Dairy, Carlisle: silo 3 inspection
Site or premises address	Highfield Dairy, Kingmoor Road, Carlisle
Client or organisation	Highfield Dairy Ltd
Record date	22 Sep 2026
Person completing the record	L. Brennan, engineering manager

This supports assessment by competent people. It is not an entry permit, gas-clearance certificate, rescue plan or permission to enter based on a completed form.

HSE states that entry should be avoided where possible. Where entry is unavoidable, a safe system of work and suitable emergency arrangements are required. Assess the space and task before deciding the controls.

2. Space and alternatives

Space ID, location and task	Milk silo 3, 30,000 litre stainless vessel, raw milk intake area. Task: inspect the inside of the silo after a leak at the outlet valve.
Contents, connected plant and previous use	Raw milk, then caustic and acid cleaning in place (CIP). Connected to the CIP set, intake line, outlet pump and agitator motor on the top.
How entry could be avoided and evaluation of alternatives	Camera inspection through the top manway done first on 18 September. It showed a mark near the outlet weld but not clear enough. Supplier advised a close look and a dye test from inside. Remote options were tried and judged not enough.
Assessment outcome	Entry considered unavoidable

3. Hazards and controls**Hazard 1: Residual cleaning chemicals**

Specified risk and task-related hazard	Residual cleaning chemicals
People affected and exposure route	Entrant, by skin contact and splash, and anyone at the manway.
Isolation, atmosphere, ingress or other controls	CIP line disconnected and blanked at the silo. Final water rinse, then drain and check rinse water pH before entry.

How effectiveness will be verified	pH of drain water recorded on the permit. Blank seen in place by the supervisor.
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Hazard 2: Agitator starting during entry

Specified risk and task-related hazard	Agitator starting during entry
People affected and exposure route	Entrant inside the silo.
Isolation, atmosphere, ingress or other controls	Agitator locked off at the isolator and the fuse removed. Personal locks from each entrant.
How effectiveness will be verified	Try start from the local panel and the SCADA screen, with no movement. Recorded on the lockout record.

Hazard 3: Low oxygen or cleaning vapours

Specified risk and task-related hazard	Low oxygen or cleaning vapours
People affected and exposure route	Entrant.
Isolation, atmosphere, ingress or other controls	Forced ventilation through the top manway for at least an hour. Continuous gas monitoring during entry.
How effectiveness will be verified	Readings taken at top, middle and bottom before entry and logged on the permit.

4. Safe system references

Approved safe system and permit process reference	Safe system of work SSW-HD-12 and confined space permit process CSP-HD-01
Atmospheric monitoring plan and competent reviewer	Four gas monitor, readings before entry and continuous during entry. Reviewed by K. Fenwick, competent person, Fellside Safety Services.
Separate rescue plan and readiness evidence	Rescue plan RP-HD-SILO rev 1, tripod and winch practice held 19 September
Communication, supervision, training and equipment needs	Two trained entrants, one top person and a supervisor. Radios and a tripod and winch at the top manway. Harness for the entrant.

5. Assessment review

Unresolved issues and conditions preventing entry	Bottom outlet valve actuator must be isolated by the controls contractor before the permit is issued. No entry until that is done and recorded.
Competent assessment reviewer	K. Fenwick, Fellside Safety Services
Changes requiring reassessment	Any change of task, such as welding or grinding inside, a change to the cleaning chemicals or a new connection to the silo.

6. Actions and review

Are further actions required? Yes

Further action 1: Isolate the bottom outlet valve actuator and record it on the lockout record.

Action and evidence reference	Isolate the bottom outlet valve actuator and record it on the lockout record.
Person responsible	R. Moss, controls contractor
Target date	24 Sep 2026
Action status	In progress
Outstanding limitations and information to pass on	Assessment covers inspection and dye testing only. Any weld repair needs a new assessment and hot work permit.
Record status	Further work needed
Reviewed by	K. Fenwick
Review date	23 Sep 2026
Author signature	

L. Brennan

Signing records the information entered. It does not itself certify legal compliance, remove a limitation or authorise unsafe work.